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Abstract—A Software-Defined Network (SDN) controller (aka.
Network Operating System or NOS) is regarded as the brain of
the network and is the single most critical element responsible to
manage an SDN. Complimentary to existing solutions that aim
to protect a NOS, we propose an intrusion protection system
designed to protect an SDN against a controller that has been
successfully compromised. Gwardar maintains a virtual replica of
the data plane by intercepting the OpenFlow messages exchanged
between the control and data plane. By observing the long-term
flow of the packets, Gwardar learns the normal set of trajectories
in the data plane for distinct packet headers. Upon detecting an
unexpected packet trajectory, it starts by verifying the data plane
forwarding devices by comparing the actual packet trajectories
with the expected ones computed over the virtual replica. If the
anomalous trajectories match the NOS instructions, Gwardar
inspects the NOS itself. For this, it submits policies matching the
normal set of trajectories and verifies whether the controller
submits matching flow rules to the data plane and whether
the network view provided to the application plane reflects the
changes. Our evaluation results prove the practicality of Gwardar
with a high detection accuracy in a reasonable time-frame.
Index Terms—Software-Defined Network; SDN
Security;Controller Security
I. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND
In the era of cyber-war and cyber-terrorism, attackers are
targeting the very core of today’s network infrastructure [1],
[2]. Attacks against the network infrastructure have three
key properties, which make them attractive for attackers: 1)
are hard to detect, 2) take a long time to fix, and 3) once
successful, may grant the most unrestricted type of access to
information [3].
Software-Defined Network (SDN) has emerged as a fun-
damental re-design of traditional networks with increased
adoption in the past few years. Numerous proposals have
emerged that leverage its capabilities to either improve ex-
isting network-based services or create new ones [4]. These
proposals assume a secure and trusted SDN platform, which
has motivated an active area of research aiming to do so.
Securing SDN’s layered architecture is not straightforward,
mainly due to the incompatibility of existing solutions [5] and
the added number of threat vectors. As discussed in [6], the
most dangerous SDN specific threat vectors are a) compro-
mised network controllers and b) malicious SDN applications.
In fact, a successful attack at SDN control plane (or, ‘the
brain of the network’) could potentially grant an attacker the
capability to control the entire network and target both the
service provider and its users.
Existing solutions proposed to secure the control plane of
an SDN mainly protect a controller when interacting with
other layers. Solutions such as [7]–[9] aim to secure an
SDN controller against malicious applications installed at
the application plane by applying advanced access control
restriction mechanisms. Another line of research is focused on
the secure composition of policies submitted by different SDN
applications (e.g. [10], [11]). The SDN Appstore ecosystem
and the different types of SDN controllers (e.g. centralized
vs. decentralized, different architectures and designs, imple-
mentation languages and ongoing updates) pose an on-going
challenge for these solutions.
On the other hand, an increasing number of studies aim
to secure the southbound API and data plane layer of SDNs.
For instance, an attacker can manipulate the controller’s view
of the network by tampering with the OpenFlow messages
exchanged between a controller and the network forwarding
devices. Alternatively, a malicious forwarding device can
execute a Denial of Service (DoS) attack against its controller
and take down an SDN. We provide an extensive survey in
[3].
Here, we focus on the scenario where the controller has
been maliciously compromised by an attacker either by com-
promising the SDN controller software (also known as the
Network Operating System or NOS) or by violating the
access privileges. The latter may be due to the presence
of a malicious administrator (i.e. an insider) or malicious
applications installed on a controller. In fact, a NOS is hosted
on a commodity server and may be subject to software hacks
as any other application. For instance, an SDN rootkit [12]
grants an attacker the capability to adversely re-program a
network while concealing its attempts. To the best of our
knowledge, only a few solutions have been proposed against
such a powerful adversary and most SDN security solutions
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assume a secure and trusted NOS. Tatang et al. have proposed
SDN-GUARD [13], which aims to detect malicious network
programming attempts by an SDN rootkit. However, the threat
model used in this work is specific to SDN rootkits and the
proposed solution assumes that the NOS is not compromised.
We propose Gwardar, an Intrusion Protection System (IPS)
designed to protect an SDN against compromised SDN con-
trollers. Gwardar retrieves the packet trajectories from the data
plane and creates normal models for packet trajectories travers-
ing the network forwarding devices. Gwardar also maintains
a virtual replica of the network by intercepting the OpenFlow
messages exchanged between the control and data plane. This
virtual replica is used to verify the normal models created
for the packet trajectories. Whenever derivations are detected,
Gwardar first performs a trajectory-based inspection of the for-
warding devices by employing the attack detection algorithms
of WedgeTail [14]. For this, it compares the suspicious packet
trajectories ‘with the expected ones computed over the virtual
replica that it maintains to detect and locate possible malicious
forwarding devices. Thereafter, if the anomaly matches the
rules specified by the control plane, it inspects the control
plane. For this, Gwardar submits flow rules matching the
normal set of trajectories to the controller with a high priority
and evaluates whether: a) the controller submits the flow rules
correctly to the data plane, and b) the controller updates
the global network view available to applications after these
changes. Gwardar detects a compromised NOS when any of
the conditions above are invalid. Gwardar may be programmed
by its administrator on how to respond to threats. By default,
however, it retrieves rules from the most valid virtual replica
copy it maintains and applies the valid flow rules to remove
the malicious trajectories. In extreme cases, Gwardar may be
programmed to take over the network until the NOS has been
fixed.
Hereon, we discuss the threat model that Gwardar is degined
against in §II, present an overview of its architecture in §III,
and evaluations results in §IV. We conclude the paper in §VI.
II. THREAT MODEL & ASSUMPTIONS
We consider one of the least explored but strongest ad-
versaries against an SDN, where an attacker has managed
to compromise the NOS either partially or completely. No
restrictions are assumed on how the attacker has compromised
the controller and we focus on detecting and preventing the
malicious actions. The adversary’s goal is to install malicious
flow rules to drop, replay, misroute and modify the packets
in a random or selective manner affecting all or part of the
traffic being routed through the data plane. Moreover, the NOS
is assumed to be capable of concealing these actions from
the upper layers. Hence, the malicious behaviours cannot be
detected just by querying the NOS for global network view.
We assume that the SDN has been trustworthy and secure
long enough time for Gwardar to learn the normal behaviour of
the network (i.e. has not been compromised since day one).
Lastly, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first work
that assumes an attacker may have compromised more than
one layer of an SDN. In fact, when detecting threats Gwardar
inspects both the network data plane and control plane. Lastly,
we assume that the application plane and the communications
through the northbound and southbound APIs are secure.
III. ARCHITECTURE OF GWARDAR
As shown in Figure 1, Gwardar is composed of two main
components: Detection Engine and Protection Engine. In a
nutshell, the former aims to detect threats while the latter is
designed to rectify issues and if not possible, take over as a
temporary acting NOS.
A. Detection Engine
The detection engine has five main phases. Phase-I: Re-
trieving the actual packet trajectories, identifying the scanning
regions and computing the normal packet trajectory models for
these regions. Phase-II: Intercepting the OpenFlow messages
exchanged between the control and data plane to maintain
a virtual replica of the network over a Mininet network. It
also involves computing the expected packet trajectories over
the virtual replica, which match the normal packet trajectory
models retrieved in Phase-I. Phase-III: The anomaly detection
phase takes as input the output of prior phases and verifies the
normal packet trajectory models to detect anomalies. Phase-
IV: Upon detection of anomalies, Gwardar starts by inspecting
the data plane forwarding devices. For this, it employs the
attack detection algorithms used in [14]. This process involves
retrieving trajectories that a packet may take against each
of the other forwarding devices and comparing them with
the actual trajectories retrieved from the network. Gwardar’s
Expected DB and Actual DB are used to provide these trajec-
tories. Phase-V: If the anomalous trajectories match the flow
rules submitted by the control plane, Gwardar moves to the
NOS inspection phase. This process involves: a) creating flow
rules matching the normal model trajectory, b) intercepting
and verifying the associated OpenFlow FlowMod messages
submitted by controller to data plane, and c) querying the
network view and verifying whether it reflects the changes
submitted.
B. Protection Engine
Gwardar’s protection engine reacts to threats detected by the
detection engine in order to apply temporary fixes. In fact, if
an attacker manages to take over an SDN controller it becomes
a very resourceful adversary and it becomes rather difficult to
restore the network to normal conditions without the inter-
vention of a trusted administrator. Hence, the following two
mechanisms are envisioned for Gwardar’s protection engine:
a) immediate protective forwarding policies to protect the
critical services and resources, and b) taking over all network
configurations using the most recent trusted configurations.
For the former, Gwardar’s administrator defines the policies.
The policy specification and implementation mechanisms are
similar to the ‘Response Engine’ of WedgeTail [14]. In the
second case, Gwardar retrieves the forwarding device config-
urations from the most recent and trusted network snapshot
it maintains and applies them by sending FlowMod messages
to the network. No further updates are applied to the network
hereon.
Fig. 1: Gwardar Architecture
C. Gwardar’s Main Components
Gwardar builds on several core functional features we
proposed in our earlier work WedgeTail [14]. These include
creating a virtual network replica by intercepting OpenFlow
messages exchanged between the control and data plane (‘Vir-
tual Replica’), retrieving expected packet trajectories for spe-
cific packet headers (‘Expected Trajectory Extractor’), tracking
packets over the network and creating packet trajectories
(‘Actual Trajectory Extractor’). These components have been
used as the building blocks of Gwardar and provide input to its
different components. In the following, we succinctly present
these components.
Normal Extractors The Normal Extractor components are
responsible to process the trajectory databases (i.e. ‘Actual
DB’ and ‘Expected DB’). ‘Normal-A Extractor’ has two
main functions: I) identifying the scanning regions, and II)
computing the normal model for packet trajectories for each
scanning region. For the former, Gwardar keeps track of
trajectories for all packets on all ports over time and identifies
the most commonly involved forwarding devices by looking
at the denser regions. For this purpose, as also in [14] we use
Unsupervised Trajectory Sampling technique [15]. Algorithm
1 represents how the normal model is calculated. In a nutshell,
the normal model is time dependent and composed of the
normal model of all different trajectories in each scanning
region. The process involves breaking down each packet
trajectory in a scanning region into smaller time-dependent
trajectories and retrieving the forwarding devices involved
in these trajectories. These are then stored as the normal
forwarding devices for a packet trajectory. Breaking down
trajectories during this process makes calculating the normal
model efficient. Moreover, it helps reducing the false positives
by minimizing the impact of networking configurations such as
load balancing, which might result into temporary trajectories.
Once the normal model is created, whenever there is a
Forwarding Device (FD) at time t+ 1 that is not available in
the normal set, the Anomaly Detector component is triggered.
Anomaly Detector The anomaly detector takes as input the
forwarding device detected as anomalous. It then requests the
‘Normal-E Extractor’ component to to retrieve the expected
Algorithm 1 Normal Extractor for a trajectory
Input: Ti ∈ SRi, Time t
List Normal(Ti)
for all FD(x) ∈ Ti.ForwardingDevices() do
List L = {all FDs at least 2 hops away from FD(x)}
for all y = L.ForwardingDevices() do
Packet Pck;
Time-dependent Trajectory Tj,t;
List Normal;
Pck.Source() = FD(x);
Pck.Destination() = FD(y);
Pck = Find-Packet(Pck.Source, Pck.Destination);
Tj,t = Actual Trajectory (Pck);
Normal(Ti) =+ Tj,t.ForwardingDevices();
end for
end for
packet trajectories using ‘Header Space Analysis’ module for
the packet leading to anomaly. It then inspects all the forward-
ing devices in the packet trajectory to detect the root cause. For
this Gwardar uses the attack detection algorithms proposed in
our earlier work [14], which would enable Gwardar to locate
the potentially malicious forwarding device(s) and detect their
exact malicious action including packet drop, misroute, and
etc.
If the anomaly detector does not detect a forwarding device
as the cause of the unexpected trajectory and this anomaly
re-occurs, the NOS inspection phase is started.
Inspection Flow Rule Creator & NOS Verifier The
former submits a set of flow rules fixing the anomalous packet
trajectory to the controller. This rule is then submitted to the
NOS through the Gwardar SDN App with a high priority (i.e.
it will not be replaced in the policy composition process).
The NOS Verifier component listens for OpenFlow FlowMod
messages submitted to the data plane and verifies whether
these are correct. Note that the custom flow rules submitted by
the controller are removed from the network once intercepted
to ensure the data plane status is stable and not affected by
Gwardar’s checks.
Network View Verifier SDN Gwardar App queries for the
Number of Zib54 Sprint
Forwarding Device 54 316
Subnet 750 48751
Rules 8752 7492131
Trajectory 11723 252169
TABLE I: Overview of simulated networks
network view from the NOS using the Northbound API and
using the ‘Network View Verifier’ module evaluates whether
the network view reflects the updates submitted. The most
recent flow rules matching the network conditions before in-
spection are resubmitted to the network to restore the network
view after the inspection phase.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION & EVALUATION
Compared to solutions such as WedgeTail [14] and SPHINX
[5], Gwardar is not envisioned to be installed as an application
for SDN controllers. Instead, it is designed as a trusted
third-party application with full access to an SDN platform
responsible to verify it. In order to work, Gwardar does not
require tampering with either the control or data plane and can
be easily imported into different platforms. We implemented
Gwardar mainly in Java and over simulated settings. We used
Floodlight as the network controller and evaluated Gwardar
over two simulation network settings, which were different in
terms of the number of forwarding devices, network subnets,
network rules and trajectories. Table 1 shows a comparison of
the different simulation settings.
Network Topologies, Flow Rules and Network Traffic:
Zib54 and Sprint setup network topologies were extracted from
[16] and [16] respectively. To add flow-entries, we created
an interface for a subset of prefix found in a full BGP
table of Route Views [17] and spread them randomly and
uniformly to each router as ‘local prefixes’. We then computed
forwarding tables using shortest path routing. Mausezahn [18]
and custom scripts were used to add benign traffic to the
simulated networks. As in [5], [14], our scripts imported real-
world network traces from [19], [20] to drive traffic into
Mininet.
A. Attack Scenarios & Implantation
We analyzed Gwardar’s detection success over 250 differ-
ent attack instances. These were randomly implanted using
custom developed script matching the following six different
scenarios:
Scenario-I Compromised NOS submitted malicious rules
to one forwarding device, Scenario-II Compromised NOS
submitted malicious rules to multiple forwarding devices,
Scenario-III Compromised NOS submitted malicious rules to
one forwarding devices and manipulated the network view to
conceal actions, Scenario-IV same as Scenario-III but for mul-
tiple forwarding devices, Scenario-VI One or more malicious
forwarding devices while the NOS was secure and trustworthy.
The malicious actions of forwarding devices included packet
drop, replay, misroute, and modification.
B. Performance Analysis
We measure Gwardar’s performance with respect to suc-
cessful detection of attacks and applying protections. We also
Fig. 2: False positive adjustment in Sprint setup after about 3
hours of passively intercepting network traffic.
Fig. 3: Comparison of Gwardar’s performance when detecting
threats over Zib54 and Sprint setups for 50 implanted attacks.
report on the impact of packet losses in Gwardar’s detection
success as well as resource utilization and the user-perceived
latency.
Detection Accuracy and Performance We report that
Gwardar has been able to detect all the implanted attack
scenarios over the simulated networks. We compute attack
detection time as the absolute time taken by Gwardar to detect
the anomaly and send a signal to the protection engine. This
time does not include the time take to create the normal
model as this is dependent on the network size and status.
In our simulations for Sprint setup, as shown in Figure 2,
the false positive rate reached a stable level after about 2
hours and a half. After this time the number of false positive
reached less than 5%. In those cases, Gwardar performs a full
inspection of the data plane forwarding devices. Note that in
our evaluations, we configured Gwardar to resume learning
mode after detecting major network reconfigurations.
The attack distribution was as follows: 100 attacks over
Zib54 setup and 150 attacks over Sprint setup. The average
detection time over Zib54 Setup is about 235 seconds with a
standard deviation of 9 seconds. For Sprint setup, the average
detection time is 540 second with a standard deviation of 75
seconds. Hence, the detection time scales well with respect to
the network size. In essence, it is satisfactory to a network
administrator to automatically detect attacks against the net-
work forwarding devices and NOS in about 10 minutes (after
Gwardar’s training time). Figure 3 illustrates a comparison of
detection time for 50 attacks in Zib54 and Sprint setups.
Protection Performance Gwardar’s protection engine suc-
cessfully applied the policies specified when threats were
detected. If no policy was defined, the most recent replica
of the network was retrieved and matching flow rules were
applied. One of the issues we faced was that when applying
flow rules from past to one or a set of forwarding devices,
the network routing configurations became unstable leading
to black and grey holes. Hence, it is recommended Gwardar
to apply full restoration of the network or defining custom
policies to avoid such issues during this process. A full
restoration of network flow rules over Sprint setup took on
average about 10 seconds.
Impact of Packet Losses Gwardar’s trajectory based mech-
anism is similar to [14]. We address this challenge by em-
ploying [21], which allows n detecting packet drops or gray
hole attacks in networks by exploiting the correlation between
packet delays and packet losses due to congestion.
Resource Utilization We hosted the simulated networks on
a machine equipped with Intel Core i5, 2.66 GHz quad-core
CPU and 16 GB of RAM. Gwardar was hosted on a machine
with Intel Core i7, 2.66 GHz quad-core CPU and 8 GB of
RAM. During the detection phase, the average CPU usage
reaches a maximum of 20% while the memory consumption
reaches 25%.
User Perceived Latency As a non-real time IDS, Gwardar
does not have any performance implications during its detec-
tion phase. It is not possible to generalize its performance
when preventing threats given that this is case specific.
V. RELATED WORK
As mentioned in §1, we are not aware of any existing solu-
tion aiming to detect a compromised NOS. Given that Gwardar
employs certain functions of our earlier work WedgeTail (see
§III-C), we briefly highlight their key differences. First, com-
pletely different scopes and threat models. WedgeTail aims to
detect a compromised forwarding device while Gwardar aims
to detect a compromised malicious NOS. Second, WedgeTail
scans the whole network and each and every forwarding
device after retrieving the scanning regions. Instead, Gwardar
analyzes the trajectory database and creates normal models
of the network and inspects the forwarding devices as the
first step upon detecting anomalies. Third, completely different
response capabilities. WedgeTail submits fixing policies as an
application to NOS while Gwardar submits them directly to the
network and is also capable of taking over the NOS altogether.
VI. CONCLUSION
A compromised NOS in an SDN grants an attacker limitless
number of attack vectors allowing him/her to target the ser-
vice provider and users. Complimentary to existing solutions
aiming to secure the NOS platforms, we proposed Gwardar as
an IPS designed to detect a compromised NOS based on the
network data plane trajectories and independent of underlying
software and hardware. Our solution is capable of detecting
a compromised NOS trying to conceal its actions from the
application plane of an SDN and does not require a trusted
data plane to work. Upon detection of anomalies, Gwardar
can apply patches and if required, take over the network.
Our performance metrics over simulated settings prove the
practicality of our solution. Currently, we aim to extend
Gwardar by leveraging the capabilities of stateful SDN data
planes and detecting compromised SDN applications based on
the data plane extracted trajectories.
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